Residency

I love my wife; but, I saw this comic in the AMA newsletter and couldn't help but think of her fretting turning 27 years old - HAPPY BIRTHDAY!!





As you can see, Rachel's birthday is upon us; so, happy birthday to her. My birthday was excellent, as already stated. It was made more excellent with more birthday gifts from my own parents consisting of more camping supplies. I believe we are all set to visit the woods on 4th of July weekend.

So, I said previously that I would explain the matching process. Here it goes. Let's take the disposition of ten applicants applying for eight positions between four programs. For illustration purposes, the applicants are numbered 1 to 10, and the programs are A, B, C, and D. Program A will have four positions, B will have one, C will have two, and D will have one position. The process works according to how each applicant ranks the programs to which they applied, and also how each program ranks the applicants they interviewed. Each of the ten applicants ranks the four programs as follows:

1. A C D B
2. A B D C
3. B D A C
4. B A C D
5. C D A B
6. C B D A
7. D A C B
8. D C B A
9. A D B C
10. A C D B

Notice applicants 1 and 10 had the same rank list. Now, the programs submitted the following rank lists:

A. 5 2 3 1 10 6 9 8

B. 10 2 7 6 5

C. 8 1 10 4

D. 9 2 7 10 4

Since applicants 1, 2, 9, and 10 all ranked program A as their top choice, this is where they are initially placed in the first round. Applicants 3 and 4 ranked program B as their top choice, but B didn't want 3 or 4, so B matches no one in this round. Program C was ranked first by applicants 5 and 6, so neither is placed here as C didn't rank applicants 5 or 6 at all. Program D gets 7 as he ranked it first; as did 8, but D didn't want 8. So, thus far, applicants 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are unmatched after the first round. But, they have second choices to consider.

In the second round, applicant 3 chose D as its second choice, but D doesn't want 3 either. Too bad for 3. Applicant 4 chose A second, but A didn't want this applicant. Applicant 5 ranked D second, but didn't want 5 either. Applicant 6 ranked B second, so B acquires 6. Applicant 8 chose C as its second choice. Program C now acquires 8. Now, applicants 3 4, and 5 remain unmatched.

In the third round, applicant 3 has A as its third choice, which A considers better than 1, 9 , or 10. So now program A has 2, 3, 1, and 10 knocking 9 into an unmatched position for now. Applicant 4 has C as its third choice, so C no acquires 4. Applicant 5 has A as its third choice, which A considers better than 10. Program A gets 5 and loses 10. As this is the third round, one must consider the second and third picks for applicant 9 which are D and B, respectively. Program D just loves 9, so 7 gets ousted. Applicant 10 has C and D as second and third choices. Program C considers 10 better than 4, so it acquires 10 and loses 4. Applicant 7 has programs A and C as choices two and three, but neither A nor C want applicant 7. So, applicants 4 and 7 are now unmatched.

In the final round, applicants 4 and 7 hope to gain a spot. Applicant 4 ranked D fourth, but D didn't like 4 compared to its recent gain of applicant 9. Applicant 4 thus remains unmatched. Applicant 7 ranked B fourth, and B considers its 7 better than 6. B acquires 7 and loses 6. The third and fourth choices of applicant six are now considered, which are D and A. Program D likes its 9 better than 6, and 6 just missed program A since applicants 1, 2, 3, and 5 are ranked above 6.

Alas, the final result is here:

Program A got applicants 1, 2, 3, and 5; Program B got applicant 7; Program C go applicants 8 and 10; and Program D got applicant 9. Applicants 1 and 2 got their first choice, while everyone else got their second, third, or fourth choice. Two applicants, 4 and 6, finished unmatched, which is to be expected when 10 people apply for 8 positions. Although it didn't happen in this example, it is possible that a program will have a position to which no one matches. Suppose of all the people program C ranked highly, none of them ranked C quite so high and matched elsewhere; additionally, those who didn't match higher up on their rank lists didn't rank program C. This scenario would lead to no one matching in one or both of C's positions. These open spots are then vied for by unmatched applicants in what is known as the scramble - where unmatched applicants contact via phone program directors whose programs have open spots. This is a very stressful time as these applicants already failed to match, and now must be more aggressive than ever.

I don't know if any of this blog helps people to understand how the residency match works - but I felt the need to explain it to people. It me the longest time to figure out it worked until I found something that diagrammed it out for me. Only time will tell what shall happen.